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Wrongful Discharge: Historical
Evolution, Current Developments And A
Proposed Legislative Solution
DONALD G. KEMPF, JR.
ROGER L. TAYLOR*
"Without question, the subject of wrongful discharge in at-will
employment has become one of the major legal issues, if not the
major issue, of employment law in this country."
Many countries in Europe "restrict an employer's ability to termi-
nate workers at will ' 2 and provide for job security in a number of
ways.' In contrast, the American labor scene has been governed by
the employment-at-will doctrine.4 Under this doctrine, "the worker
serves at the employer's pleasure, and dismissal is held to be the
unilateral privilege of the employer. No reasons need to be given for
termination and workers have no right to protest the dismissal." 5
This Article examines the employment-at-will doctrine and the
* Messrs. Kempf and Taylor are partners of Kirkland & Ellis and practice with
that firm's Chicago office. Both defend employment cases as a part of their general civil
practice. James D. Dasso, an associate, and Catherine M. Szekelyhidi, a legal assistant,
at their firm assisted the authors in the preparation of this article.
1. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege,
21 IDAHO L. REV. 201, 205 (1985).
2. E. LAZEAR, JOB SECURITY PROVISIONS AND EMPLOYMENT 3 (1989).
3. E. LAZEAR, EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL, JOB SECURITY, AND WORK INCENTIVES 1
(1986). "Workers who believe that they have been dismissed for unjust reasons often
have access to friendly courts. Frequently, explicit severance pay formulas are dictated




emergence of a competing doctrine that permits employees to pursue
wrongful discharge actions against their employers. The Article is
divided into three parts. Section I traces the employment-at-will doc-
trine from its 19th century origins, through its dominance during the
first half of the 20th century, to its increased erosion in recent de-
cades by both the legislative and judicial branches. Section II re-
views some significant current developments in this area. Specifi-
cally, Section II reviews: (1) two significant California Supreme
Court decisions6 that suggest that the trend toward increasing judi-
cial permissiveness of wrongful discharge suits may have reached its
high-water mark, and (2) a decision by the Montana Supreme
Court' that upheld a statute expanding the ability of employees to
bring wrongful discharge actions, but sharply limiting the damages
they may recover-the first test case of this closely-followed statu-
tory recourse. Finally, Section III proposes a legislative solution to
the current uncertainty in the wrongful discharge area and explores
some of the issues likely to be confronted in the 1990's in the strug-
gle to reach an appropriate accommodation between the sound poli-
cies that underlie the employment-at-will doctrine and the circum-
stances that have prompted recognition of the wrongful discharge
action.
I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
The emergence of the employment-at-will doctrine in the United
States was a departure from the common law of England.8 In Eng-
land, from the enactment of the Statute for Laborers in the four-
teenth century, until its repeal in the mid-eighteenth century, an em-
ployer could discharge an employee only "on reasonable cause."
Thereafter, the English courts perpetuated the spirit of the Statute
of Laborers in the common-law presumption that a general hiring
was intended as an employment contract for one year, which, unless
terminated at the end-of-the-year period, was presumed renewed for
an additional year on an evergreen basis. 10
The doctrine of at-will employment is sometimes referred to as
"Wood's Rule." Although earlier American treatises had reflected
the English common law presumption that a general hiring was for
6. Foley v. Interative Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1988); Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal. 3d 973, 772 P.2d 1059, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1989).
7. Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989).
8. See, e.g., Comment, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will-Have the
Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201, 205-06 (1982); Mauk, supra
note 1, at 203.
9. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425-26 (2d ed. 1969).
10. Id.
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one year, 1 H.G. Wood, in his 1877 treatise on masterservant rela-
tionships, asserted otherwise:
[W]ith us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring,
the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day,
week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no
presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed
for whatever time the party may serve. It is competent for either party to
show what the mutual understanding of the parties was in reference to the
matter; but unless their understanding was mutual that the service was to
extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is
determinable at the will of either party .... 12
Wood's Rule was quickly accepted. In 1884, the Tennessee Su-
preme Court held that employers "may dismiss their employees at
will . . . for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong."' 3 In 1885, New
York followed suit. Borrowing from Wood's treatise, the New York
Supreme Court held that "the rule is inflexible that a general or
indefinite hiring is, prima facie, a hiring at will; and if the servant
seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to estab-
lish it by proof."' 4 The employment-at-will doctrine "soon became
the general rule in all jurisdictions."' 5
In 1908, the vitality of the employment-at-will doctrine in the law
reached its apax in Adair v. United States.' The Adair Court, after
stating the general rule that "the right of the employee to quit the
service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right
of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of
such employee," held that federal legislation that disturbs such
equality by compelling one person to retain the personal services of
another is "an invasion of the personal liberty as well as of the right
of property guaranteed by [the 5th] Amendment."' 17 Thereafter, the
11. C. SMiTH, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 53-57 (1852).
12. H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877).
13. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
14. Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417
(1895).
15. Mauk, supra note 1, at 203. See also East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72
Tex. 70, 10 S.W. 99 (1888) (overruled by Sabine Pilot Service Inc. v. Hauck, 687
S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985)); Henry v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R.R., 139 Pa. 289, 21 A. 157
(1891); Blumrosen, Settlement of Disputes Concerning the Exercise of Employer Discre-
tionary Powers, United States Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 432 (1964).
16. 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (overuled by Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R.
& S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930)).
17. 208 U.S. at 172. The Court held that Section 10 of the Erdman Act, 30 Stat.
424, is unconstitutional. The Act made it a crime for certain common carriers to dis-
charge an employee because of membership in a labor union. Id. at 169..
employment-at-will doctrine flourished and was applied rigorously
against employees until the 1940's.18
During the 1950's and into the 1960's, the courts became "more
willing to consider the entire relationship of the parties, and to find
that facts and circumstances establish a contract which cannot be
terminated by the employer without cause."19 However, the early in-
roads against the employment-at-will doctrine were legislative, not
judicial. With the New Deal came legislation to provide workers
with added protection in their dealings with their employers. For ex-
ample, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was signed into
law in 1935.20 Under the NLRA, an employee may not be dis-
charged for participating in any lawful union activity. Federal and
state legislation followed, prohibiting discharge of employees based
on such factors as race, color, creed, national origin, or age.21 Over a
quarter of a century ago, these developments prompted one observer
to report:
The principle that the employer is presumptively free to discipline is still
formally in force, but the restraints on that freedom are now so extensive
that the principle itself is in question, and the United States' legal system
may be moving toward a general requirement of just cause and fair dealing
between employer and employee. 2
Despite this movement, there were many people, particularly those
in academic circles, who felt that the erosion of the employment-at-
will doctrine had not progressed far enough or fast enough. Perhaps
The Supreme Court abandoned the constitutional basis for the employment-at-will
doctrine in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941); Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 456 Pa.
171, 177, 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1974).
18. Blumrosen, supra note 15, at 432.
19. Id.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1947).
21. Such legislation has since become pervasive. As noted in Comment, The At-
Will Doctrine: A Proposal to Modify the Texas Employment Relation, 36 BAYLOR L.
REv. 667, 669 (1984) (footnotes omitted):
Under certain circumstances, federal and state legislation restricts an em-
ployer's right to discharge his employee arbitrarily. For example, federal law
prohibits the discharge of an employee because of age, race, religion, sex, color,
or national origin, because of union activity, service on a petit or grand jury, or
to prevent his attaining vested pension rights. Federal law also prohibits a pri-
vate employer from discharging an employee who exercises his rights to statu-
tory minimum wage and overtime and to a safe workplace. Finally, employees
who institute proceedings, cause proceedings to be instituted, or testify against
their employers for violations of various federal acts are statutorily protected
against retaliatory discharge.
In addition to the restrictions placed on the doctrine by federal statutes,
some states have enacted legislation that closely parallels federal legislation in
the area of civil rights, jury service, and worker's compensation.
See also M. SHEEHAN & J. WILNER, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE UNDER ILLINOIS LAW, at i-
iii (1988) (lists 33 federal and 15 Illinois statutes restricting an employer's right other-
wise to discharge an at-will employee).
22. Blumrosen, supra note 15, at 428.
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foremost among these critics of the employment- at-will doctrine was
Professor Lawrence Blades. In what one defender of at-will contracts
has characterized as an "early and influential attack,"23 Blades as-
serted that "there has been a blind acceptance of the employer's ab-
solute right of discharge. 24 Noting that a "dismissal has been called
'a kind of organizational equivalent of capital punishment,' "125
Blades urged that the "philosophy of the employer's dominion over
his employee . ..is incompatible with these days of large, imper-
sonal, corporate employers" and argued that the "philosophical un-
derpinnings" of the rule that permitted employee discharge at will
"have fallen into decay. 26
Blades cataloged a series of potentially abusive discharges by em-
ployers. He noted that "[h]ow frequent or widespread such abuses
are is open to question. Undoubtedly many employers would not
think of engaging in such practices. ' 2s However, Blades stressed that
"[w]hat is important is that such abuses, however common or un-
common, should not go unremedied. ' '29
Blades continued to argue that, "as a matter of constitutional
principle, the traditional rule can no longer be justified. The indus-
trial revolution made an anachronism of the absolute right of dis-
charge by destroying the classical ideal of complete freedom of con-
tract upon which it is based." ' As an alternative to the traditional
rule, Blades urged that employees be given a right of action against
their employers in the event of an "abusive" discharge. 3'
23. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 947, 949
(1984).
24. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1435 (1967).
25. Id. at 14,06, n.11 (quoting W. MOORE, THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATION
28 (1962)).
26. Blades, supra note 24, at 1416.
27. Id. at 1406-09. Among the potentially abusive discharges listed by Blades are
threats of discharge to impair an employee's political choice or his right to speak, to
secure his participation in immoral or unlawful activity, to prevent him from giving testi-
mony unfavorable to the employer, to coerce him to give up a lawful claim against the
employer, or to force him "not to deal with a particular business concern." Id.
28. Id. at 1410.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1418.
31. Blades argues:
The existing sources of protection for the employee are patently inadequate.
The question arises whether any other kind of sanction might be used. An ap-
propriate legal response would be to confer on the afflicted employee a personal
remedy for any damage he suffers when discharged as a result of resisting his
employer's attempt to intimidate or coerce him in a way which bears no rea-
sonable relationship to the employment. For convenience, a discharge so moti-
Blades recognized that an employee can protect himself or herself
from unwarranted invasion of personal rights by means of an indi-
vidually negotiated contract but argued that "individual employees
are simply not in a position to exact such contracts from their em-
ployers."32 Indeed, after noting the technical difficulties and limited
damages available in an action under contract theory, Blades as-
serted that "it seems reasonable to bypass the law of contracts" alto-
gether.33 Instead of a contract action, Blades urged that employees
should be permitted to bring a tort action. "If the employer invades
legally protected rights of the employee, for instance by the infliction
of bodily injury or defamation, the existence of the employment 'con-
tract' does not stand in the way of determining the employee's rights
under the law of torts. 34 Blades concluded that, while an employer's
right to discharge should not be unduly encumbered, an employer
should not be allowed under the law to discharge an employee for an
ulterior and improper motive:
[A]s with any individual's right to bring legal action, the law should not
allow the employer to exercise his right of discharge in order to effectuate a
purpose ulterior to that for which the right was designed. Just as the use of
legal processes as a means of extortion gives rise to a damage remedy, so
too should the oppressive use of the right of discharge,"
Anticipating Blades, a 1959 California decision became "the semi-
nal authority for the principle that the discharge of an employee for
refusing to commit an unlawful act is actionable."36 In "the first and
most notable declaration of the public policy exception" 37 to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine, the court in Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 39633 held that an employee dis-
charged for refusing to commit perjury had a cause of action against
an employer for wrongful discharge. 39 Similar decisions followed.
For example, courts upheld wrongful discharge actions against em-
ployers when employees were discharged for filing a worker's com-
pensation claim,40 and for performing jury duty.41
vated might be termed an "abusive" discharge.
Id. at 1413. Blades goes on to argue that "the fear of lawsuits would have the salutary
effect of discouraging improper attempts to interfere with the employee's freedom or
integrity, even when the employer does not intend to discharge the employee for refusing
to submit to his desires." Id. at 1414.
32. Id. at 1411.
33. Id. at 1422.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1424 (footnote omitted). Consistent with this view, Blades also urges
that, in keeping with general tort law principles, "[t]he assessment of punitive damages
in cases of abusive firings would be fitting and desirable." Id. at 1427 (footnote omitted).
36. Mauk, supra note 1, at 232.
37. Id. at 230.
38. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
39. Mauk, supra note 1, at 232.
40. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
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Two particularly significant decisions were handed down in the
mid-1970's in New England: Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.42 and For-
tune v. National Cash Register Co.43 The reason for their special
importance is that both opinions, specifically citing to Professor
Blades' 1967 article, spoke in broad, open-ended and imprecise lan-
guage. This broad language all but invited discharged employees
who were unhappy with the circumstances of their termination to file
suit and test the outer limits of the newly-emerging action for
wrongful discharge.
In Monge, a female employee who had been discharged after re-
buffing her foreman's sexual overtures was found to have a cause of
action for wrongful discharge.44 Drawing an analogy to the changes
in property rights since the "ancient feudal system," the New
Hampshire Supreme Court stated that the "law governing the rela-
tions between employer and employee has similarly evolved over the
years to reflect changing legal, social and economic conditions. 45
The court went on to express its view that "[i]n all employment con-
tracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the employer's interest
in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the
interest of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the
public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two."
46
Then, in very broad language, the court ruled as follows:
We hold that a termination by the employer of a contract of employment at
will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not
the best interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a
breach of the employment contract.47
In Fortune, a terminated salesman sued to recover certain com-
missions he alleged where due him for selling his employer's cash
registers. The salesman claimed that the employer had discharged
him in order to avoid having to pay him the commissions. At trial, a
jury found that the salesman's termination had been in bad faith and
awarded him substantial damages even though the salesman had a
written contract that expressly provided that his employment was
41. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
42. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
43. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
44. While the Monge case has generally become accepted as a straightforward sex-
ual harassment case, the dissent in Monge, as well as Epstein, supra note 23, at 971
points out, "throws a very different light on the case." See also Monge, 114 N.H. at 134-
36, 316 A.2d at 552-53 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
45. Monge, 114 N.H. at 132, 316 A.2d at 551.
46. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
47. Id.
terminable at will and without cause. The Massachusetts high court
framed the following question: "The central issue on appeal is
whether this 'bad faith' termination constituted a breach of the em-
ployment-at-will contract. Traditionally, an employment contract
which is 'at will' may be terminated by either side without reason. ' 48
The court agreed with the jury's factual finding that the employer
had acted in bad faith, stating that, where "the principal seeks to
deprive the agent of all compensation by terminating the contractual
relationship when the agent is on the brink of successfully complet-
ing the sale, the principal has acted in bad faith. . ...,49
Turning to the legal issue, the court observed that "[g]ood faith
and fair dealing between parties are pervasive requirements in our
law. .. ."5o Quoting extensively from the Monge case, the court
further noted that "[r] ecent decisions in other jurisdictions lend sup-
port to the proposition that good faith is implied in contracts termi-
nable at will.""1 The Fortune court noted that the contract was "a
classic terminable at will employment contract" and that it explicitly
reserved to the parties the power to terminate it without cause. 2
Then, as the heart of its opinion, the court ruled as follows:
However, Fortune argues that, in spite of the literal wording of the con-
tract, he is entitled to a jury determination on NCR's motives in terminat-ing his services under the contract and in finally discharging him. We
agree. We hold that NCR's written contract contains an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and a termination not made in good faith
constitutes a breach of the contract. 53
The emerging trend toward expanding the legal remedies for
wrongful discharge was "greeted with wide approval in judicial, aca-
demic, and popular circles."54 However, these early victories did not
satisfy critics of the at-will doctrine. Academic commentators, desir-
ous of further erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, believed
that the doctrine was an "archaic relic that should be jettisoned
along with other vestiges of nineteenth-century laissez-faire. ' 'B5 As
one student Note put it: "[a] veritable avalanche of scholarly opinion
has, with near unanimity, come down in favor of abolishing the at-
will rule." 58 The common theme of these writings was that even
48. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 100, 364 N.E.2d 1251,
1255 (1977).
49. Id. at 104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
50. Id. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
51. Id. at 103, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
52. Id. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1255.
53. Id. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1255-56.
54. Epstein, supra note 23, at 982.
55. Id. at 948 (examples are cited at Id. n.4).
56. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1931, 1931 (1983) (examples are cited at Id. n.3);
see also Decker, At-will Employment: A Proposal For Its Statutory Regulation, 1 HoF-
STRA LAB. L.F. 187, 187 n.8 (1983).
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though the at-will employment doctrine might have been viable in
the nineteenth century, it is no longer acceptable given modern day
economic, technological, and sociological realities, 57 and that "the
courts should recognize the public's interest in eliminating the power
of employers to discharge their employees without just cause." 58
Throughout the 1980's, the courts continued to provide employees
with an expanding right to pursue wrongful discharge actions against
their employers. Some recoveries have been grounded in the law of
contracts. 59 Others have rested on principles found in the law of
torts.60 Many decisions blur their grounds, however, providing the-
reader with little guidance as to whether they are based on contract
theory, tort theory, or some amorphous amalgam of the two.61
As summarized by one Comment, the contract law theories gener-
ally fall "into one of two categories: first, a duty of good faith and
fair dealing inherent in the contractual relationship, and second, an
implied contract right emanating from an employer's policy state-
ments, handbooks, or conduct. '6 2 Similarly, courts "that recognize a
tort cause of action for wrongful discharge do so under one of two
primary categories: intentional torts and the public policy excep-
tion."6 3 Of these two, "the public policy exception is the more widely
accepted ... 64
Those jurisdictions willing to allow recovery under intentional tort
theories generally recognize three types of pure tort actions: "(1) a
prima facie tort; (2) intentional interference with the performance of
57. Comment, The At Will Doctrine: A Proposal to Modify the Texas Employ-
ment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667, 688 (1984).
58. Note, supra note 56, at 1933.
59. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983);
Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 115 Ill.2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314
(1987) (collecting cases).
60. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (disapproved by Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654,
765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988); Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass.
96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
61. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974);
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980)
(disapproved by Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1988)).
62. Comment, supra note 57, at 670. A number of states "hold employers to a
judicially mandated standard of good faith and fair dealing in their employment con-
tracts." Id. at 671-72. See also Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty To Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
In those states, 4n employer may in certain circumstances be held liable for violating this
implied covenant if he discharges an employee in bad faith. Id. at 1817, 1821.
63. Comment, supra note 57, at 675-76.
64. Id. at 676.
a contract; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress."65
Likewise, the public policy exception can generally be classified into
three broad categories: exercising a specifically conferred statutory right;
refusing to violate a law or a statutory or ethical obligation, including
'whistleblowing;' and exercising a right or meeting an obligation not specifi-
cally conferred or mandated by statute, but which is nevertheless condoned
by public policy.66
Even the most ardent advocates of an expansive wrongful-dis-
charge doctrine recognize that, while the judicial decisions to date
"indicate an increasing dissatisfaction with the at will doctrine
. . . , no consistent rationale for restricting the employer's power to
terminate has emerged."' 87 Indeed, as one recent article put it:
"[w]hat has resulted has been a maze of seemingly inconsistent and
often illogical 'opinions which only compound the uncertainty facing
employers in an often hostile or volatile climate."68
In light of this confusion, the question of whether the judiciary or
the legislature is best suited to modify the at-will rule is subject to
debate. 9 Some commentators have urged that courts should take the
lead:
Courts possess the legitimate heritage of common law innovation that devel-
ops new principles to accommodate changing values, and are therefore an
appropriate forum for the creation of job security rights. Because courts
have considerable experience with similar employment relations problems,
they possess sufficient expertise to resolve wrongful discharge disputes.
Thus, courts need not await legislative initiative to effect doctrinal change
65. Id.
66. Id. at 679. Other commentators have generally followed similar categorization.
Thus Mauk, supra note 1, at 232 (footnote omitted) states:
Commentators have classified the various violations of public policies with
headings such as whistle-blowing, retaliatory discharge, refusal to do illegal
acts and discharge for conduct which public policy would encourage. For anal-
ysis these cases can be divided into four categories where employees are dis-
charged: (1) for refusing to commit unlawful or unethical acts; (2) for per-
forming public obligations; (3) for exercising statutory rights or privileges; and(4) for reporting an employer's unlawful conduct.
Similarly, Note, supra note 56, at 1936-37 (footnotes omitted) states:
Although the public policy exception is still evolving, courts have so far
found it to apply to discharges involving three broad categories of motives.
1. Refusing to Commit an Unlawful Act. - The most typical cases are those
of employees fired for refusing to give false testimony at a trial or administra-
tive hearing.
2. Performing an Important Public Obligation. - Several states have recog-
nized a cause of action for employees fired for serving jury duty, for 'blowing
the whistle' on illegal conduct by their employers or for refusing to violate a
professional code of ethics.
3. Exercising a Statutory Right or Privilege. - A third category of cases in-
volves employees fired for filing workers' compensation claims or refusing to
take polygraph tests.
67. Note, supra note 62, at 1824.
68. Cosgrave & Zwick, Identifying Public Policy in Retaliatory Discharge Cases
in Illinois, 1988 ILL. B.J. 506, 506.
69. Comment, supra note 57, at 685.
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in the employment-at-will area. Courts themselves created the at-will rule;
it is therefore entirely appropriate that they now take the lead in modifyingit.70
In contrast, other commentators are of the view that courts "are
likely to be long on generalization and short on detail" 71 and there-
fore urge a legislative approach. Some of those who would otherwise
favor a judicial approach have taken the position that some kind of
legislative action is necessary because of the courts' reluctance to
modify the common law at-will doctrine. 2 Most recently, some of
those who favor legislation have concluded that it "is unlikely that
there will be substantial change providing for comprehensive wrong-
ful discharge legislation in the foreseeable future."7 3 Because of their
belief that "the new common law of wrongful discharge has provided
employer and employee with the worst of all possible worlds,"74
these commentators have urged that arbitration is the best
approach.7
5
Against this historical backdrop, the California Supreme Court re-
cently handed down its two important and widely discussed decisions
in Foley76 and Newman,7 7 and the Montana Supreme Court ad-
dressed the viability of a new legislative approach in its Meech7 8
decision.
II. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Judicial Refinement of Wrongful Discharge: The Foley and
Newman Decisions in California
1. Backdrop of Foley and Newman
In 1983, the highest courts in thirty-six states had each considered
challenges to at-will employment based on common law theories of
tort and contract. Of those, twenty-five had either modified the at-
70. Note, supra note 62, at 1838.
71. Decker, supra note 56, at 199.
72. Comment, supra note 57, at 687.
73. Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13
EMPLOYEE REL L.J. 404, 423 (1987-88).
74. Id. at 413.
75. Id. at 415. See also Arbitration Seen as Possible Answer to New Wrongful
Discharge Theories, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No 216, at A-1 (1988).
76. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1988).
77. Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal. 3d 973, 772 P.2d 1059, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1989).
78. Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989).
will rule or demonstrated a willingness to do so in the future.79 By
1987, the situation had progressed to the point that:
[s]carcely a day goes by during which some employee does not file suit in
state or federal court against his or her employer, protesting a dismis-
sal-the basis for it, the way in which it was done, or the circumstances
surrounding it. Although there are no precise statistics available, it is clear
that wrongful discharge litigation, which was hardly known in the 1970s, is
increasing geometrically. .... 0
One commentator proclaimed that "[t]he outcome of these recent
wrongful termination cases suggests that the 1980s will be
remembered as the decade in which judges forged the idea that em-
ployees have a property interest in their job."8' But if courts across
the country were scrambling to jump on the wrongful-discharge
bandwagon, California was clearly in the vanguard. 2 As one scholar
put it: "To borrow from the musical Oklahoma, California, like
Kansas City, has gone about as far as they can go."88
Not only had a California court fashioned the 1959 "seminal au-
thority" for the public-policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine in Petermann,4 but also thereafter the California courts led
the way in rapidly expanding the range of employer actions that
were held to provide the terminated employee with a viable wrongful
discharge action. The recognized theories included tort causes of ac-
tion for discharges in violation of public policy;85 contract causes of
action for breach of implied-in-fact covenants to discharge for only
good cause;88 and causes of action for tortious breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in all contracts.8 7
A host of intermediate California appellate court decisions and
dicta in California Supreme Court and federal cases may have led
commentators and lower courts to conclude that certain of these
wrongful discharge theories-such as tort recovery for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith-were "well established in Califor-
79. Note, supra note 56, at 1931.
80. Gould, supra note 73, at 405.
81. Id.
82. "[I]n the 1980s, courts throughout the country fashioned numerous exceptions
to the at-will principle. California courts . . . led the way." Gould, State's High Court
Takes Wrong Turn on Job Rights, L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1989, pt. 5, at 3.
83. Gould, supra note 73, at 406.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
85. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (termination for refusal to particpate in illegal price fixing
scheme).
86. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr.917 (1981) (arbitrary termination of 32-year employee despite implied promise by the
employer that he would not discharge arbitrarily).
87. -See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., ll Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980) (arbitrary termination, despite a written policy to the con-
trary, provides "a cause of action for wrongful discharge that sounds in both contract
and in tort").
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nia." 88 However, the California Supreme Court did not squarely ad-
dress many of these issues until Foley and Newman.
The California Supreme Court decisions in Foley8" and Newman0
reflected a deeply divided court. In each case, the vote was four to
three. In each case, both the majority and minority opinions were
sharply critical of each other. Moreover, these decisions were widely
reported as a major setback for would-be plaintiff-employees in
wrongful discharge actions. Thus, in reporting on the Foley decision,
the New York Times stated that "[i] n a major victory for employers,
the California Supreme Court today sharply narrowed the right of
dismissed employees to bring suit on the basis of wrongful dismis-
sal." 91 Similarly, in response to the Newman decision, the Wall
Street Journal reported that, "[t]he state that helped pioneer the
right of fired workers to sue former employers for large damages
took another step toward killing that legal concept."92
2. Foley v. International Data Corp.
In Foley,93 the plaintiff-employee had been hired as an assistant
product manager for computer-based decision-support services. He
received a steady series of salary increases, promotions, bonuses,
awards, and superior performance evaluations. His complaint alleged
that he had been orally assured of job security so long as his per-
formance remained adequate, but that he was terminated shortly af-
ter reporting to his employer that his new supervisor was under in-
vestigation by the FBI for embezzlement from his former
employer.94 Foley's complaint sought recovery from his employer
under three separate and distinct theories: (1) a tort cause of action
alleging a discharge in violation of public policy; (2) a contract cause
88. Mauk, supra note 1, at 249.
89. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1988).
90. Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal. 3d 973, 772 P.2d 1059, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1989).
91. Fisher, California Court Limits Suits by Dismissed Employees, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 30, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1. See also Hager, Justices Limit Damages in Fired Work-
ers' Suits; Boon for Employers Seen in State Supreme Court Decision Against Emo-
tional, Punitive Awards, L.A. Times, Dec. 30, 1988, pt. 1, at 1; Schlender, California
Ruling Curtails Damages in Dismissal Suits, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1988, at B6.
92. Schmitt, California Court Further Restricts Right of Fired Workers to Sue
Ex-Employers, Wall St. J., May 26, 1989, at A3.
93. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
94. In fact, after Foley's discharge, the supervisor pleaded guilty to a felony count
of embezzlement. Id. at 664 n. 1, 765 P.2d at 375 n.1, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213 n.1.
of action for breach of an implied-in-fact promise to discharge for
good cause only; and (3) a cause of action alleging a tortious breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 5 The court
examined each of Foley's theories individually.
a. Tortious Discharge in Contravention of Public Policy
In a portion of the opinion in which six of the seven justices con-
curred, the Foley court reaffirmed the wrongful discharge tort theory
that "the employer's right to discharge an 'at will' employee is still
subject to limits imposed by public policy, since otherwise the threat
of discharge could be used to coerce employees into committing
crimes, concealing wrongdoing, or taking other action harmful to the
public weal."96 The court emphasized that, because it was allowing
recovery under a tort theory based on overriding public policy con-
siderations, it made no difference whether the discharged employee
had a contract terminable at will or a contract terminable only after
a specified length of time. The court quoted with approval the ra-
tionale of Koehrer v. Superior Court:97
[T]here is no logical basis to distinguish in cases of wrongful termination
for reasons violative of fundamental principles of public policy between situ-
ations in which the employee is an at-will employee and [those] in which
the employee has a contract for a specified term. The tort is independent of
the term of employment.9 8
The court reasoned that permitting tort recovery does not enforce
the employment contract; it vindicates public policy:
When such a termination occurs, the nature of the employee's relationship
with the employer, whether at-will or contractual, is essentially irrelevant.
What is vindicated through the cause of action is not the terms or promises
arising out of the particular employment relationship involved, but rather
the public interest in not permitting employers to impose as a condition of
employment a requirement that an employee act in a manner contrary to
fundamental public policy.99
The court reserved some issues for later determination, stressing
that "[w]e do not decide in this case whether a tort action alleging a
breach of public policy . ..may be based only on policies derived
from a statute or constitutional provision or whether nonlegislative
sources may provide the basis for such a claim." 100 Still, the court
held that "[riegardless of whether the existence of a statutory or
constitutional link is required . . ., disparagement of a basic public
95. Id. at 654, 765 P.2d at 374, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
96. Id. at 665, 765 P.2d at 376, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
97. 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1166, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826 (1986).
98. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 667, 765 P.2d at 377, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
99. Id. at 667 n.7, 765 P.2d at 377-78 n.7, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 215-26 n.7.
100. Id. at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
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policy must be alleged . . .
Turning to Foley's factual situation, the court stated that
"[w]hether or not there is a statutory duty requiring an employee to
report information relevant to his employer's interest, we do not find
a substantial public policy prohibiting an employer from discharging
an employee for performing that duty." ' 2 Accordingly, Foley was
denied recovery under this theory, with the court emphasizing that
"[w]hen the duty of an employee to disclose information to his em-
ployer serves only the private interest of the employer, the rationale
underlying the . . . [breach-of-public-policy exception to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine tort] cause of action is not implicated."10 3
b. Breach of Employment Contract
All seven justices joined the second part of the Foley decision.
That part addressed Foley's claim that his employer's conduct and
personnel policies had given rise to an "oral contract" not to fire him
without good cause. The lower court had rejected this claim, but the
California Supreme Court reinstated and remanded it for trial to
determine whether Foley could support his claim with credible evi-
dence. If so, the court held that Foley could recover, although it ex-
pressly left unresolved the issue of the proper "measure of damages
in a wrongful discharge action based on breach of contract." 04 Al-
though the court remanded this claim, it continued to discuss the
theory of a contract cause of action for breach of an implied promise
not to discharge except for good cause.
The court noted that a review of other jurisdictions "reveals a
strong trend in favor of recognizing implied contract terms that
modify the power of an employer to discharge an employee at
will."' 0 5 The court concluded that the decision of a California appel-
late court in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. 06 had "correctly applied
basic contract principles in the employment context." The Pugh
101. Id.
102. Id. at 670, 765 P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
103. Id. at 670-61, 765 P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218. Only Justice Mosk
dissented from this portion of the Foley decision, stating that "[i]t is my opinion that
such action-i.e., advising a state-created corporation of the employ in a supervisorial
position of a person chargeable with a potential felony-is in the best interests of society
as a whole, and therefore covered by the public policy rule." Id. at 724, 765 P.2d at 418,
254 Cal. Rptr. at 256. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 682 n.24, 765 P.2d at 388 n.24, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 226 n.24.
105. Id. at 676, 765 P.2d at 384, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
106. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
court allowed recovery for the wrongful discharge of an employee
who had been employed by a candy company for thirty-two years.
The employee had been told "'if you are loyal . . . and do a good
job, your future is secure'" on the ground that this created an im-
plied-in-fact contract that he would be discharged only for good
cause.
10 7
The Foley court began its own analysis "by acknowledging the
fundamental principle of freedom of contract: employer and em-
ployee are free to agree to a contract terminable at will or subject to
limitations."10 8 The court noted that California's Labor Code10 9 es-
tablished a statutory presumption that employment is at-will in the
absence of express oral or written agreement covering length of em-
ployment or grounds for termination. The court held that "[t]his
presumption may, however, be overcome by evidence that despite the
absence of a specified term, the parties agreed that the employer's
power to terminate would be limited in some way, e.g., by a require-
ment that termination be based only on 'good cause.' "110
The court went on to explain that:
[t]he absence of an express written or oral contract term concerning termi-
nation of employment does not necessarily indicate that the employment is
actually intended by the parties to be 'at will,' because the presumption of
at-will employment may be overcome by evidence of contrary intent. Gener-
ally, courts seek to enforce the actual understanding of the parties to a con-
tract, and in so doing may inquire into the parties' conduct to determine if
it demonstrates an implied contract.11
The court noted in this regard that courts, over the years, had "in-
creasingly demonstrated their willingness to examine the entire rela-
tionship of the parties to commercial contracts to ascertain their ac-
tual intent" 1112 and stated that judicial recognition of resulting
"enforceable expectations" did not "diminish the force" of contrac-
tual or legal obligations.11 3  Rather, the court suggested,
"[p] ermitting proof of and reliance on implied-in-fact contract terms
does not nullify the at-will rule, it merely treats such contracts in a
manner in keeping with general contract law. '1 14
107. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 676, 765 P.2d at 384, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
108. Id. at 677, 765 P.2d at 385, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
109. Cal. Lab. Code § 2922 (West 1989).
110. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 677, 765 P.2d at 385, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 679, 765 P.2d at 386, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
113. Id. at 680, 765 P.2d at 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
114. Id. at 681, 765 P.2d at 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
132
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c. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
The third part of the Foley decision was the focus of the court's
division and bitterness and is generally of the greatest interest and
importance. The court held that "contractual remedies" were the
"sole available relief for breaches of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the employment context,""15 thus foreclos-
ing punitive damages as well as damages for emotional distress.
The court began its analysis by noting the widespread judicial,
legislative, and scholarly acceptance of the proposition that every
contract, employment or otherwise, imposes on each party an obliga-
tion of good faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforce-
ment of the contract." 6 The court stressed that "[b]ecause the cove-
nant is a contract term, however, compensation for its breach has
almost always been limited to contract rather than tort remedies."1117
The court considered whether an exception to this general rule
should be made in the case of employment contracts-as had been
done in the case of insurance contracts. The majority of the court
concluded that an exception should not be created.
The minority asserted that the majority's decision was "a radical
attempt to rewrite California law"" 8 and that "there are eight unan-
imous [California] Court of Appeal decisions permitting a tort ac-
tion for bad faith discharge, plus dictum approving such an action
in" two prior California Supreme Court cases and in a decision by a
California federal appeals court." 9 The majority made two points in
response. First, the majority emphasized that, whatever encourage-
ment the earlier dictum in California Supreme Court rulings may
have given to proponents of a tort action for wrongful discharge, the
dictum should have also "highlighted" for the lower courts "that this
question remained to be decided by this court:" there has "clearly
and indisputably, been no holding by this court that such a cause of
action exists.' 2 °
Second, the majority criticized the reasoning of the eight Califor-
nia lower court rulings and observed that "the clear majority of ju-
115. Id. at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
116. Id. at 683, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
117. Id. at 684, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
118. Id. at 701, 765 P.2d at 402, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 240 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 705-06, 765 P.2d at 405, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
120. Id. at 688-89 nn.27-28, 765 P.2d at 392-94 nn.27-28, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 230-
32 nn.27-28.
risdictions [elsewhere] have either expressly rejected the notion of
tort damages for breach of the implied covenant in employment
cases or impliedly done so by rejecting any application of the cove-
nant in such a context."121 In a lengthy footnote, the majority added
that "[ifn only three cases outside of California have courts held
that a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives
rise to tort damages," and that "almost every court considering the
issue outside of California has either totally rejected applying the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment contracts, or
has limited recovery for breaches of the covenant to contract
damages." '22
The court found that the analogy to breach of insurance contracts
was not sufficiently persuasive to warrant recognition of a tort action
for employment contract breach. In support bf its finding, the court
emphasized two factors: (1) after the breach an employee can get
another job, but an insured cannot get another policy to cover his
past loss; and (2) the interests of the insurer and the insured are
"financially at odds," while those of the employer and employee "are
most frequently in alignment."12 3
The court also stated that there was not a "special relationship"
between employer and employee that would justify imposition of tort
liability for breach of the implied covenant in the employment con-
text.124 In this regard, the court quoted with approval the following
passage from Putz & Klippen: 25 "'[t]he fundamental flaw in the
'special relationship' test is that it is illusory. It provides a label to
hang on a result but not a principled basis for decision . . . .The
qualifying contracts cannot be identified until the issue has been liti-
gated, which is too late.' "126
The Foley court also highlighted the fact that allowing recovery of
compensatory tort damages and punitive damages for breach of the
implied covenant would produce "the anomalous result that hence-
forth the implied covenant in an employment contract would enjoy
protection far greater than that afforded to express and implied-in-
fact promises, the breach of which gives rise to an action for contract
damages only.1127 By way of footnote, the court added that "with
regard to an at-will employment relationship, breach of the implied
covenant cannot logically be based on a claim that a discharge was
made without good cause. If such an interpretation applied, then all
121. Id. at 686, 765 P.2d at 391, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
122. Id. at 686-87 n.26, 765 P.2d at 391-92 n.26, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30 n.26.
123. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
124. Id. at 690-93, 765 P.2d at 394-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232- 34.
125. Putz & Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Fees-Not Tort Liabil-
ity--Is The Remedy for "Stonewalling", 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 419, 478-79 (1987).
126. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 691, 765 P.2d at 395, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
127. Id. at 698, 765 P.2d at 400, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
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at-will contracts would be transmuted into contracts requiring good
cause for termination."' 28 The court went on to quote with approval
the following observation by the Arizona Supreme Court: "[w]hat
cannot be said is that one of the agreed benefits to the at-will em-
ployee is a guarantee of continued employment or tenure.' '129
Ultimately, the Foley court concluded that the question of
whether a tort remedy should be allowed for breach of the implied
covenant, as well as the parameters of any such remedy, should be
left for the legislature. The court reviewed the substantial body of
judicial and scholarly writing on this question and the diversity of
views presented, commenting that "[t]hese various approaches on
the one hand suggest a widespread perception that present compen-
sation is inadequate, but on the other hand vividly demonstrate sub-
stantial disagreement about the propriety or even the potential form
of tort remedies for breaches of contractual duties of covenants.' 3 0
The court concluded:
The issue is how far courts can or should go in responding to these concerns
regarding the sufficiency of compensation by departing from long estab-
lished principles of contract law. Significant policy judgments affecting so-
cial policies and commercial relationships are implicated in the resolution of
this question in the employment termination context. Such a determination,
which has the potential to alter profoundly the nature of employment, the
cost of products and services, and the availability of jobs, arguably is better
suited for legislative decisionmaking.131
The court added that "[11egislatures, in making such policy deci-
sions, have the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit the advice
of experts, and hold hearings at which all interested parties may pre-
sent evidence and express their views.'113 2 Notably, the court began
this part of its opinion by stressing that "predictability about the
cost of contractual relationships plays an important role in our com-
mercial system" and ended it by underscoring that "of primary sig-
nificance, we believe that focus on available contract remedies offers
the most appropriate method of expanding available relief for wrong-
ful terminations. The expansion of tort remedies in the employment
context has potentially enormous consequences for the stability of
the business community.' 133
128. Id. at 698 n.39, 765 P.2d at 400 n.39, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 238 n.39.
129. Id. (quoting Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 385,
710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (1985)).
130. Foley, at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
131. Id. at 694, 765 P.2d at 397, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
132. Id. at 694 n.31, 765 P.2d at 397 n.31, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235 n.31.
133. Id. at 683, 699, 765 P.2d at 389, 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227, 239.
In its conclusion, the court summarized: "we hold that tort reme-
dies are not available for breach of the implied covenant in an em-
ployment contract to employees who allege they have been dis-
charged in violation of the covenant.' 34
3. Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp.
In Newman,"3 5 the California Supreme Court addressed an issue
not considered in Foley: whether the Foley decision-and, in partic-
ular, the third portion of Foley holding that there was no tort cause
of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in an employment contract-would apply prospectively only
or whether it would be applied retroactively to all pending cases as
well. The Foley decision expressly left this issue open for future reso-
lution, stating "[w]e do not reach the issue of the retroactive or pro-
spective application of our opinion. The parties have not briefed or
argued the question and we will deal with the matter in a later case
when we have the benefit of the views of counsel."' 36 In Newman,
the California Supreme Court, dividing 4-3 along exactly the same
lines as it had on the critical third part of Foley, resolved that open
issue by holding that the Foley decision was fully retroactive. 137
As in Foley, the opinions in Newman reflected the sharp division
of the court. Thus, the minority characterized the majority opinion
as a "convoluted analysis" that was "riddled with problems."' 38 For
its part, the majority all but accused the minority of being duplici-
tous. Noting that the dissenting justices had been in the vanguard of
the movement to provide retroactive application when extending the
reach of tort law, the majority chided that "[iut is difficult to draw a
principled distinction depriving tort defendants of the benefits of the
now- controlling rule of law, when in the past we have routinely ret-
roactively accorded to plaintiffs the benefits of changes in tort
law."' 3 9 Then, to drive home the point, the majority quoted at
length, and with a healthy dose of sarcasm, from a prior opinion by
the author of the minority opinion in Newman:
Justice Broussard, writing for the majority, persuasively explained: 'Califor-
nia courts have routinely applied overruling decisions retroactively even
though such decisions redefined the duty owed, thus the conduct prohib-
ited. [Citations.] Although one could draw a distinction between expansion
of liability for compensatory damages and increasing punishment by impo-
134. Id. at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
135. Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal. 3d 973, 772 P.2d 1059, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1989).
136. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 700 n.43, 765 P.2d at 402 n.43, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 240
n.43.
137. Newman, 48 Cal. 3d 973, 772 P.2d 1059, 258 Cal. Rptr. 592.
138. Id. at 994, 772 P.2d at 1073, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 606 (Broussard J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 984, 772 P.2d at 1066, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
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sition of punitive damages, the effect is the same: exposure to a form of
damages for which the defendant was not previously liable. . . . [I]n this
instance, the increased liability is merely a change in the remedy for en-forcing defendant's obligation to refrain from drunk driving, not a change
in the nature of the obligation itself.""'
Similarly, Foley did not change the nature of an employer's obligation
under the contract, including adherence to the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The employer remains bound by all express and im-
plied terms of the contract, and any breach thereof is still actionable. Foley
simply changed the nature of the remedy available for the breach . 41
In support of its ruling, the court stated that "[the general rule
that judicial decisions are given retroactive effect is basic in our legal
tradition" and observed in this regard that "virtually all of this
court's previous ground-breaking tort decisions have been applied
retroactively, even when such decisions represented a clear change in
the law. Exceptions have been rare and we will find no reason to add
to that short list in this case. "142
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Newman is its further elab-
oration of Foley. The Newman opinion opens with a succinct sum-
mary of the three rulings in Foley:
In Foley . . ., we held that in the context of an alleged wrongful discharge
from employment (i) a plaintiff may seek tort damages based on a claim
that he was discharged in violation of a fundamental public policy, (ii) the
statute of frauds does not bar contract relief based on breach of an oral or
implied-in-fact contract not to terminate an employee except for good
cause, and (iii) an employee may not obtain tort relief for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment contract;
the covenant is a contract term and relief for its violation accordingly is
limited to contract damages.143
Later, in seeking to use the underlying rationale in Foley as fur-
ther support for retroactive application, the court stated that "[o]ur
Foley holding on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing issue
had two primary motivations and goals." 1" The court identified as
its first concern "the distinction between tort and contract remedies
and the importance of giving effect to the true expectations of the
parties to a contract." 45 The court explained that "Foley's reaffir-
mation that the focus of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing actions rests in the expectations of the parties is fully consis-
tent with retroactive application of our decision to contracts entered
140. Peterson v. Super. Ct., 31 Cal. 3d 147, 161-62, 642 P.2d 1305, 1313, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 784, 792 (citation omitted; italics added).
141. Newman, 48 Cal. 3d at 991, 772 P.2d at 1071, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
142. Id. at 978-79, 772 P.2d at 1062, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
143. Id. at 975-76, 772 P.2d at 1060, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
144. Id. at 988, 772 P.2d at 1069, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
145. Id.
into before that decision was filed. 146
The court identified as a second major concern expressed in Foley
that "permitting tort remedies for breach of the covenant tended to
undermine 'predictability of the consequences of actions related to
employment contracts.' ",147 Again, the court found that retroactive
application would "generally ameliorate" this concern.148
4. Response to Foley and Newman
In assessing the significance of Foley and Newman, most observers
have treated them as "a far-reaching victory for business. 14 Some,
however, have claimed that these rulings "will actually aid fired
workers."150 Focusing on the "'three totally distinct bases on which
an employee may sue'" that were upheld in Foley-and not merely
on the damage restrictions found in the third portion of Foley-these
observers believe that Foley "'opens the door to a potentially expan-
sive use' of suits by employees who believe that they were fired im-
properly."15' As they see it, ".'[t]he extent of damages is limited, but
the legitimacy of the claims is more clear.' "152
However, most observers see Foley and Newman as putting a
damper on both the number of future wrongful discharge cases and
the potential liability exposure. "[O]ne big effect of the two decisions
may be to deprive middle-income and lower-income employees of
their days in court because attorneys will be less inclined to bring
cases where compensatory damages are relatively small."1 3 Where
the potential recovery is small, the potential contingent fee for the
employee's lawyer will not provide much incentive to file suit. As one
observer summarized, "'the effect of these two cases will be to make
plaintiffs' lawyers, much more circumspect in the kinds of cases that
146. Id. at 989, 772 P.2d at 1069, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 602. Still bitter over the
earlier Foley ruling, the minority's retort in Newman to the resurrection of this point was
that "[t]he retroactive application of Foley does not give effect to the parties' expecta-
tions; it gives the employer an immunity from tort damages he did not expect, and takes
from the worker a remedy he thought he possessed." Id. at 998, 772 P.2d at 1076, 258
Cal. Rptr. at 609 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 989, 772 P.2d at 1069, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 602 (quoting Foley v. Interac-
tive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 696, 765 P.2d at 373, 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 236).
148. Newman, 48 Cal. 3d at 989, 772 P.2d at 1070, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 603. Re-
sponding, the minority claimed that this concern "clearly points to a prospective applica-
tion." Id. at 998, 772 P.2d at 1076, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
The minority observed that nothing "can alter or facilitate past predictions" and said
that Foley would simply disappoint most past predictions since it was counter to prior
California rulings. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
149. Hager, supra note 91, pt. 1, at 1.
150. Groves & Williams, Some Believe Ruling Will Actually Aid Fired Workers,
L.A. Times, Dec. 30, 1988, pt. 1, at 29.
151. Id. (quoting W.C. Quackenbush).
152. Id.
153. Schmitt, supra note 92, at A7.
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they are willing to take.' "154
Foley's limitation on damages available for wrongful discharge
contract claims may spur counsel for discharged employees to scruti-
nize the circumstances of each discharge for facts that would sup-
port tort claims such as defamation, false light, and intentional in-
fliction of emotional harm. Such claims may permit employees, if
successful, to recover damages not available under Foley for emo-
tional distress or punitive damages. Counsel for employers, on the
other hand, should advise their clients to handle discharges in a
manner that avoids conduct that would support such alternative or
supplemental tort theories.
B. Legislative Refinement of Wrongful Discharge: The Meech
Decision in Montana
1. Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act
In 1987, Montana enacted the Wrongful Discharge From Employ-
ment Act ("Act"). The Act is briefly summarized as follows:
Under the terms of the Montana statute, employees who don't belong to a
union or have individual contracts gain broad protections from arbitrary
dismissals. The law forbids firing without showing 'good cause,' as deter-
mined by a court.
But in exchange for this benefit, the law limits damages to no more than
four years of back pay and benefits and excludes any recovery for emotional
distress. Punitive damages, awards designed to punish a defendant rather
than compensate the plaintiff, are barred except in cases where the em-
ployer demonstrated fraud or malice. 155
After the Act became effective, an employee sued his employer for
wrongful discharge in the Montana federal district court.156 The em-
ployee claimed that the employer had made an implied promise that
if the employee performed satisfactorily, he could keep his job for
the rest of his career, and that he had been fired in breach of this
promise. The employee's suit sought damages for emotional distress,
wages for approximately 20 years, and punitive damages. The em-
ployer said that the discharge had been part of a corporate restruc-
turing and moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that, regardless
of the employer's motivation for discharge, the Act precluded the
employee's common-law claims. The federal court certified two ques-
tions to the Montana Supreme Court for ruling:
154. Id.
155. Dockser, Wrongful-Firing Case in Montana May Prompt Laws in Other
States, Wall St. J., Jul. 3, 1989, at 11.
156. Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989).
(1) Is the ...Act ...unconstitutional in that it serves to wrongfully
deprive an individual falling within the purview of the Act from his or her
right to "full legal redress" within the meaning of... the Montana
Constitution?
(2) Are those provisions of the ...Act which expressly prohibit recov-
ery of noneconomic damages, and limit the recovery of punitive damages,
violative of an individual's right to "full legal redress" within the meaning
of . . the Montana Constitution? 1 7
By a 4-3 vote, the Montana Supreme Court answered both questions
in the negative, holding that the Act did not run afoul of the Mon-
tana Constitution. 5 As in Foley and Newman, there were sharp dif-
ferences among the justices, with the principal dissenter proclaiming
that "[t]his is the blackest judicial day in the eleven years that I
have sat on this Court. Indeed it may be the blackest judicial day in
the history of the state."'5 9
Meech was closely followed by management and labor because at
least a dozen states-including California, New York, and Illi-
nois-had similar legislation pending. The Montana law was also be-
ing considered as a basis for proposed model legislation.1 0
The three principal operative sections of the Montana Act have
been codified as 39-2-904, 39-2-905, and 39-2-913, which provide as
follows:
39-2-904. ELEMENTS OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE. A discharge is wrongful
only if:
(1) it was in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate public policy
or for reporting a violation of public policy;(2) the discharge was not for good cause 61 and the employee had com-
pleted the employer's probationary period of employment; or
(3) the employer violated the express provisions of its own written person-
nel policy.162
39-2-905. REMEDIES. (1) If an employer has committed a wrongful dis-
charge, the employee may be awarded lost wages and fringe benefits for a
period not to exceed 4 years from the date of discharge, together with inter-
est thereon. Interim earnings, including amounts the employee could have
earned with reasonable diligence, must be deducted from the amount
awarded for lost wages.
(2) The employee may recover punitive damages otherwise allowed by
law if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the employer
engaged in actual fraud or actual malice in the discharge of the employee
in violation of 39-2-904.
(3) There is no right under any legal theory to damages for wrongful
discharge under this part for pain and suffering, emotional distress, com-
pensatory damages, punitive damages, or any other form of damages, ex-
157. Id. at 488-90.
158. Id. at 488, 490.
159. Id. at 507 (Sheehy, J., dissenting opinion).
160. Dockser, supra note 155, at 11.
161. 39-2-903(5) defines "good cause" to mean "reasonable job-related grounds
for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the
employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason." MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-
903(5) (1989).
162. Id. § 39-2-904 (1989).
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cept as provided for in subsections (1) and (2).'18
39-2-913. PREEMPTION OF COMMON-LAW REMEDIES. Except as provided in
this part, no claim for discharge may arise from tort or express or implied
contract.'"
2. The Act Does Not Violate the Full Legal Redress Provision
In its analysis of whether the Act violated the Montana State
Constitution's "full legal redress" provision, the Meech court placed
particular emphasis on "the general rule that no one has a vested
interest in a rule of common law. .... "165 Citing to Oliver Wendell
Holmes, the court stressed that, like courts, "[1]egislatures in the
Anglo-American system have long been held to possess the authority
to expand or reduce claims and remedies available at common
law." '166 Noting further that "'[t]he Constitution does not freeze
common law rights in perpetuity,' "1167 the court proceeded to ex-
amine the constitutional provision at issue, Article II, Section 16,
which states as follows:
Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded
for every injury to person, property, or character. No person shall be de-
prived of this full legal redress for injury incurred in employment for
which another person may be liable except as to fellow employees and his
immediate employer who hired him if such immediate employer provides
coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of this state. Right andjustice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.'6 8
Examining in detail both prior cases and the history surrounding
the language inserted in 1972 (debates, explanatory pamphlets, etc.),
the court found that the delegates had "narrowly drafted" the
amendment to accomplish a "single purpose."'' 69 "Specifically, the
addition prevents lawmakers, that is both the courts and the legisla-
ture, from denying workers' compensation claimants a cause of ac-
tion against negligent third parties for job related injuries. The
amendment did not seek to define 'full legal redress' as a fundamen-
tal right which could not be altered by the legislature."' 70 The court
163. Id. § 39-2-905 (1989).
164. Id. § 39-2-913 (1989).
165. Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 496 (Mont. 1989).
166. Id. (citing O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 112 (1881)).
167. Meech, 776 P.2d at 496 (quoting Reeves v. Ille Electric Co., 170 Mont. 104,
113, 551 P.2d 647, 652 (1986)).
168. Meech, 776 P.2d at 496 (quoting MONT. CoNsT. art. II, § 6 (1889, amended
1972). The language in italics was added to Montana's 1889 Constitution by the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1972.
169. Meech, 776 P.2d at 497.
170. Id. at 499.
overruled three prior Montana Supreme Court decisions "insofar as
they hold that Article II, § 16 of the Montana Constitution guaran-
tees a fundamental right to full legal redress. 1 71 Holding that there
was no such fundamental right to full legal redress, the court went
on to quote with approval the general rule that:
[a] constitutional provision that courts of justice shall be open to every per-
son, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every
injury 'to person, property, or reputation, is not intended as a limitation
upon the legislative branch of the government where the legislation in-
volved deals with rightful subjects of legislation.27 2
3. The Act's Limitation on Damages Does Not Violate the Full
Legal Redress Provision
Turning next to the question of whether, under any circumstance,
the Act's limitations on noneconomic damages, punitive damages
and the like violated the "full legal redress" provision, the Meech
court held that they did not. Initially, the court reframed the issue as
follows: "[d]o the limitations on the recovery of certain damages in
the Act violate equal protection because the Act unconstitutionally
burdens a class of claimants seeking damages for wrongful dis-
charge? '173 The court held that they did not. The court first decided
to use a "rational basis test" in determining whether the limitations
were permissible.174 Then the court stated as follows:
Until recently, the fundamental body of law governing available damages in
the employment area has been contract law. Courts, by virtue of their
power to alter the common law, have expanded employers' liability by rec-
ognizing tort claims in the employment context. The legislature has now
acted to reverse this trend by restricting damages for wrongful discharge.
This decision to limit liability "emerges as a classic example of an economic
regulation-a legislative effort to structure and accommodate 'the burdens
and benefits of economic life.'" Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group (1978), 438 U.S. 59, 83, 98 S. Ct. 2620, 2636, 57 L. Ed. 2d
595, 617-18.,A statutory "limitation on recovery is a classic economic regu-
lation, . . . [which] must be upheld if it is reasonably related to a valid
legislative purpose." Boyd v. Bulala (W.D. Va. 1986), 647 F. Supp. 781,
786 (finding heightened scrutiny inappropriate for reviewing liability-limita-
tion under requirements of Virginia's remedy guarantee).
The Court in Duke Power pointed out that use of the rational basis test
harmonizes with the rule that the legislature may alter the common law:
Our cases have clearly established that "[a] person has no property,
no vested interest, in any rule of the common law." [citation omitted].
The "Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the
abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a per-
missible state object," [citation omitted], despite the fact that "other-
wise settled expectations" may be upset thereby. Duke Power, 438
171. Id. at 491.
172. Id. at 500 (quoting 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 616, at 564
(1979) (emphasis added)).
173. Meech, 776 P.2d at 502.
174. Id.
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U.S. at 88, n.32, 98 S. Ct. at 2638, n.32.175
Quoting the general rule that "'[t]here is no vested right to exem-
plary damages and the legislature may, at its will, restrict or deny
the allowance of such damages,' ""6 the court held the "Act's provi-
sion on punitive damages is constitutional."1 7 Additionally, the
court held that the Act's other damage restrictions must also pass
"equal protection muster.' 78 The court found that "[t]he legislative
history of the Act demonstrates that lawmakers perceived an unrea-
sonable financial threat to Montana employers from large judgments
in common-law wrongful discharge claims," and that they perceived
as well that these threats "could discourage employers from locating
their businesses in Montana. The Act's limitation on damages is in-
tended to alleviate these threats. ' 17 9 The Meech court found further
that the Act also provides benefits for employees that "are not illu-
sory."'180 These include restrictions on employers' ability to discharge
"without cause," prejudgment interest, and recovery for fringe bene-
fits as well as lost wages. I8 1 Taken together, the various tradeoffs
between the interests of the employer and those of the employee re-
flected in the Act were held to be "in no sense irrational" and met
the "rational basis test" for constitutionality.8 2
4. Dissenting Opinion
In a dissent that was perhaps more emotional than analytical, the
minority challenged the claim that the Act "provided great new
rights for discharged workers".'" Instead, the minority stated that
"[t]he legislature, in effect, has converted the tort of wrongful dis-
charge into a sort of contract action by the adoption of the Wrongful
Discharge From Employment Act. The legislature refused, nonethe-
less, to provide all the elements of the damages allowable for breach
of contract."' 84 In effect, the minority asserted, a "legislature pur-
porting to give a wronged employee some rights, instead, took away
175. Id. at 502-03.
176. Id. at 504 (quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 239, at 326 (1965)).
177. Meech, 776 P.2d at 504.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 506.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 505.
183. Id. at 507 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 509 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
any possible right of meaningful recovery. ' 185
Finally, turning to the majority's "rational basis test," the minor-
ity charged that "it is not a legitimate state purpose to protect em-
ployers from their unscrupulous acts as against the traditional rights
of individuals to earn their livelihood," and that "no case can be
made on a rational basis to sustain a law the principal purpose of
which is to subsidize, protect or enhance the acts of wrongdoers."""
According to the minority, the "only basis for the Act," was that "as
between business and the workers, the legislature discriminatingly
prefers business. That is not a constitutional basis on which to found
a statute.
187
5. The Impact of Meech
The primary impact of the Meech decision may well be to en-
courage legislatures in other states to pass "compromise" legislation
such as the Montana Act. As reported in the Wall Street Journal,
'The Montana decision has cleared the way legally for [other legis-
latures] in terms of the broad constitutional challenge,' said Theo-
dore J. St. Antoine, a professor at the University of Michigan Law
School and a draftsman of the proposed model bill."188
III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: AN ANALYSIS
The 1980's witnessed a continual erosion of the employment-at-
will doctrine and a concomitant increase in the acceptance of the
wrongful-discharge doctrine. However, the recent developments on
the judicial and legislative fronts discussed in the preceding section,
suggest that perhaps the pendulum has begun to swing the other
way. These recent developments may well signal an end to the ex-
pansion of the wrongful discharge theory at the expense of the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine.1 8 9
As noted, legislation similar to that in Montana is under active
consideration in more than a dozen states, including several of the
largest, and work is underway to draft a model bill that could serve
as a framework for any state.190 Additionally, a number of scholars
have waded in with their own statutory proposals.1 91 The remainder
of this Article argues that there is a need for legislation concerning
wrongful discharge, while acknowledging that obstacles exist to a
185. Id. at 510 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 516 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 517 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
188. Dockser, supra note 155, at 11.
189. See Note, supra note 62, at 1834.
190. See supra text accompanying note 160.
191. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 56.
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legislative solution. Despite these obstacles, we propose our own
"model" wrongful discharge legislation.
A. Problems With Judicial Resolution of the Wrongful
Discharge Issue
Well over a century ago, it was observed that "hard
cases . ..make bad law."'192 That has certainly been true in the
wrongful discharge area. Most of the leading cases in which the
wrongful discharge cause of action is rooted involved particularly of-
fensive conduct by the employer that led the court to bend or break
the employment-at-will doctrine-firing employees for refusing to
commit perjury, for performing jury service, and the like.
Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc.193 is a classic example. In Savodnik,
"a model employee" was terminated "solely to deprive him of his
pension benefits."'" 4 Putting the employment-at-will doctrine to the
test in the worst possible context, the employer seemed to the court
"to agree" that it discharged the employee "for this very purpose,"
and merely urged the court that "however contemptible such behav-
ior may be, it is simply not illegal." After noting that "no case in
New York has yet recognized the tort of abusive discharge," the
court bristled that "[t]o allow an employer to avoid the vesting of
rights in a pension plan after thirteen years of service by a model
employee, under the guise of the employment at will doctrine, does
not sit well with this Court.1 195 Perhaps not surprisingly, given the
context, the court recognized a wrongful discharge action under New
York law, stating:
If ever there were a case to invoke the doctrine of abusive discharge, this is
it. Courts cannot hide in ivory towers ignoring the economic and social real-
ities of modem society, for it is that very society we are here to serve. As
that society changes, so must our thinking. We are convinced New York
courts would recognize the abusive discharge doctrine on the facts of this
192. Ex parte Long, 3 W.R. 19 (1854). A half-century later, Holmes elaborated
on this theme as follows:
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great,
not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but
because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to
the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a
kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubt-
ful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
193. 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
194. Id. at 826.
195. Id.
case.196
The problem is that in providing a wrongful discharge action rem-
edy to employees in these extreme cases, the courts have too often
spoken in broad language that has opened a wide door for future
actions by discharged employees in far less offensive situations.
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.19 7 is a good example. In
Palmateer, an employee was fired for supplying the police with in-
formation concerning illegal activities by a fellow employee. While
the court found that this conduct was against the specific and well-
recognized public policy of encouraging citizens to cooperate with
the police, the court went on to define public policy in extremely
broad terms, stating that it "concerns what is right and just and
what affects the citizens of the State collectively."' 98
More recently, courts in a number of jurisdictions have tried to
temper the overly broad language of their initial rulings in the
wrongful discharge area.199 As noted in Foley, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court has now "confined Monge to cases in which the em-
ployer's actions contravene public policy. '200 And four years after its
Fortune decision, "[iln Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,20'
the Massachusetts Supreme Court declined to adopt a rule equating
the absence of good cause for a discharge with the absence of good
faith . . . . If good faith means good cause, it is argued, then the
doctrine of at-will employment is meaningless. 20 2
The ebb and flow of these cases demonstrates the uncertainty that
characterizes the common law. Accordingly, a resolution is needed in
the wrongful discharge area. As Professor Coase has emphasized,
"while 'the delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market
transactions . . . the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of
production) is independent of the legal decision.' This is the essence
196. Id. at 826-27 (footnote omitted).
197. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
198. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
199. See, e.g., Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21
(1981); Howard v. Don Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980). These more
recent decisions suggest that employers will fare better in court when, instead of a rote
incantation of the employment-at-will doctrine, they (1) provide at least a plausible, non-
offensive rationale for the specific discharge at issue, and (2) spell out in detail the sound
policy reasons SUPPORTING the employment-at-will doctrine. It should be noted in the
latter regard that not all scholars have subscribed to the erosion of the employment-at-
will doctrine by the courts..As one particularly persuasive article puts it, "there is no
principled reason of fairness or utility to disturb the common law's long-standing pre-
sumption in favor of the contract at will." Epstein, supra note 23, at 977.
200. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 686, 765 P.2d 373, 391, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211, 229 (citing Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273
(1980)).
201. 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981).
202. Mauk, supra note 1, at 252.
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of the Coase Theorem. 2 0 3 Once the legal ground rules are clearly
established (whatever they are), private negotiation will lead to the
arrangement between the parties that maximizes overall wealth. Ab-
sent such clear ground rules, the market uncertainty caused by the
existing common law will result in less than optimal arrangements.
Likewise, in the absence of definite legal rules, individual employ-
ers must take into account the risk and expense of a lawsuit in virtu-
ally every contemplated discharge-even that of an at-will employee.
Litigants and the bar face continued unpredictability and, in many
jurisdictions, the unfathomable irony that a person discharged as a
result of intentional race or sex discrimination may not be able to
recover punitive damages, while a person discharged without "good
cause" can.1°4 Thus, it appears that legislation such as that which we
propose is needed to quell the tide of uncertainty faced by both em-ployees and employers.
B. Obstacles to the Legislative Approach
Legislative proposals, however, face significant hurdles. For exam-
ple, we have seen the close and sharp divisions on the Supreme
203. R. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 158 (1988) (citing R.
Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 25 (1959) (footnote
omitted)); see also R. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 174-75 (1988); E.
LAZEAR, supra note 3, at 17 ("The rhetoric that surrounds contrast between employ-
ment-at-will and job security may be just that. The issue may be one that depends more
on implicit prices induced by the unemployment compensation system than on court doc-
trine."). "[I]n a perfect world, any mandated transfer from employer to worker can be
undone by an efficient contract." E. LAZEAR, supra note 3, at 23.
204. Wrongful discharge plaintiffs may, in some states, recover punitive damages.
See, e.g., Carter v. Catamore Co., 571 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (applying Rhode
Island law) ("Since violation of [the duty of good faith and fair dealing] sounds in con-
tract" as well as "in tort, punitive damages may sometimes be obtainable."); K Mart
Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364, 1373 (1987) (upholding an award of
punitive damages for the firing of a tenured employee in order to save having to pay him
retirement benefits); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(2) (1989) (authorizing claims for
punitive damages when the employee established by clear and convincing evidence that
the employer engaged in actual fraud or actual malice in the discharge). In contrast,
plaintiffs suing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (1981) - which makes it unlawful to discharge any individual because of his
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" - cannot recover punitive damages. E.g.,
Boddy v. Dean, 821 F.2d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 1987) ("It is settled beyond dispute in this
circuit that a plaintiff may not recover either compensatory or punitive damages in a
,Title VII action."); Shah v. Mt. Zion Hospital and Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272
(9th Cir. 1981) ("The great weight of authority denies. . . punitive damages under Title
VII.").
Courts in California" and Montana.20 ' The same divisions are
likely to be present elsewhere throughout the country. More impor-
tantly, those judicial divisions mirror the divisions that will be seen
in the community generally as these issues are addressed in the fu-
ture. Those divisions present a substantial obstacle to the enactment
of legislation concerning wrongful discharge.
Will workers support such legislation? Unions have long been able
to bargain successfully to secure protection for union members from
discharge without good cause.20 7 Moreover, the general desire of un-
ions to provide workers with protections not otherwise available has
meant that "traditionally, unions have been ambivalent, if not down-
right hostile, to the idea of legislation instituting arbitration of dis-
missal claims outside the collective bargaining context. ' 08 In Febru-
ary of 1987, however, the AFL-CIO Executive Council adopted a
statement "that calls for legislation establishing employee protection
against 'arbitrary' employer conduct and provision of 'safe-
guard . . . against discharges without cause' for all workers," a
protection that "should be available to all workers 'as a basic labor
standard' that is the 'hallmark of a decent society.' "209
Will employers support such legislation? In discussing legislative
proposals more permissive than the Montana Act, Blades observed
more than two decades ago that "[o]ne need not be an extreme cynic
to say that employers would not favor such legislation. 210 Others,
however, take the view that "[i]nstead of opposing legislation, the
prudent employer should welcome a statutory scheme as providing
an orderly legal remedy outside of the courtroom.1211 This would
seem particularly true, since, as has been suggested, "[u]nder ex-
isting guidelines, the boundaries of these actions are defined only by
the imagination of the plaintiff's attorneys. 21 2
However, as one scholar recently noted:
[t]he current debate about a better system has resulted in a legislative
standoff in California and other states. It is complicated by the conservative
view, articulated by the Chicago school of economists, that all attempts to
limit employer authority by legislation or common-law litigation are mis-
guided in that they interfere with the market.213
"Employee-rights lawyers say that although they favor legislation
205. See supra notes 88-141 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 158-87 and accompanying text.
207. "Over ninety percent of collective bargaining agreements in the United States
limit the employer's power to discharge." Note, supra note 62, at 1832.
208. Gould, supra note 73, at 417.
209. Id. at 404 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added, emphasis in original,
respectively).
210. Blades, supra note 24, at 1434.
211. Decker, supra note 56, at 202.
212. Comment, supra note 8, at 228 (footnote omitted).
213. Gould, supra note 73, at 420.
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that requires 'good cause' for firing, they object to limits on awards.
And lawyers for management argue that the law has greatly re-
stricted their right to dismiss employees without penalty."2 14
C. Proposed Model Legislation
The prospects for a return to the employment-at-will doctrine are
remote in light of the trend of judicial decisions and business prac-
tices and mores over the past half century. Wi believe that a legisla-
tive compromise can accommodate these opposing views. Such legis-
lation would provide that an employee without an individual written
employment contract can be discharged only for a legitimate busi-
ness reason, but that a discharged employee in a wrongful discharge
action can recover only limited damages for lost earnings and bene-
fits-we suggest a maximum of four years, plus attorneys' fees. We
believe that wrongful discharge legislation also should include an in-
centive for employers to review discharge decisions carefully and to
afford the affected employee an opportunity fully to express the em-
ployee's position during that review.
In exchange for implementation of an internal review procedure,
we propose that an employer's decision, if upheld upon internal re-
view, be givendeference by the courts. Specifically, we propose that
if an employer shows that an employee discharge was reviewed
under an internal review procedure and affirmed by a review com-
mittee of disinterested employees, the employer's final decision be
given a prima facie presumption of validity. The presumption could
be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that the discharge
was not for a legitimate business reason. To allay potential employer
concerns, the proposed model act also allows employers to challenge
internal review committee decisions, subject to the same clear and
convincing evidence standard.
By exempting employees who have written employment contracts
with their employers that include express provisions governing termi-
nation, our proposal allows for arbitration. However, arbitration is
possible only if the employer and the employee have entered into a
written employment contract in which they have agreed to submit
such disputes to binding arbitration. The Montana Act establishes a
framework (and an incentive) for voluntary arbitration, 15 and others
have urged that "[a]ny statute should take the initial handling of
214. Dockser, supra note 155.
215. Meech v. Hillhaven West Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 490-91 (Mont. 1989).
these matters out of the court's jurisdiction. Instead, all employee
termination disputes should be handled by arbitrators. 2 6
We believe that providing an incentive for thorough and balanced
internal reviews through the approach that we suggest is preferable
to arbitration. Such internal review procedures- including an op-
portunity for the affected employee to be heard- provide a powerful
incentive for both immediate supervisors and reviewing managers to
make careful and fair decisions based upon legitimate reasons. These
internal review procedures will guard against the kind of harsh em-
ployer decisions that were sufficiently offensive to prompt courts to
develop the wrongful-discharge doctrine initially. Affording the em-
ployee an opportunity to be heard also enhances both the probability
of balanced employer decisions and the likelihood that affected em-
ployees will accept the ultimate decision. Thus, we believe that en-
couraging formal internal employer review will reduce the number of
wrongful discharge claims that result in litigation. Arbitration in
contrast, would simply offer a different, although perhaps less costly,
method of litigating discharge claims.
The suggested legislative approach, eliminates the employment-at-
will doctrine and substitutes a requirement of a legitimate business
reason for an employee's discharge. Although such a proposal un-
doubtedly will prompt objections from employers, our experience
persuades us that such objections would not be reflective of contem-
porary employer-employee relations.
Like it or not, the inescapable reality is that the doctrine of em-
ployment-at-will has been eroded by contemporary business prac-
tices, as well as by the judicial wrongful-discharge doctrine. We have
found that most employers with relatively few employees do not un-
derstand that the employment-at-will doctrine might permit them to
discharge employees without reason. Larger employers generally
have personnel policies and procedures calculated to require legiti-
mate business reasons for discharges. Our proposal would simply im-
pose upon existing business practices a degree of formality intended
to discourage truly "wrongful" discharges and to enhance the likeli-
hood that ultimate discharge decisions will be accepted by both the
employer and the employee.
The suggestion to give those employer decisions upheld upon inter-
nal review prima facie validity undoubtedly will provoke objections
from employee advocates. Nevertheless, we believe that it is sound
public policy to give employers some latitude to make decisions
about employees in exchange for abolition of employment-at-will. In-
terestingly, Blades, one of the earliest and strongest advocates of the
wrongful-discharge doctrine, recognized that "the employer's prerog-
216. Decker, supra note 56, at 200 (emphasis added).
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ative to make independent, good faith judgments about employees is
important in our free enterprise system" and that the wrongful-dis-
charge doctrine carried with it the possibility of "vexatious lawsuits
by disgruntled employees fabricating plausible tales of employer co-
ercion."2 17 Blades recognized as well that "[i]f the potential for vex-
atious suits by discharged employees is too great, employers will be
inhibited in exercising their best judgment as to which employees
should or should not be retained.
218
In light of these concerns, Blades urged that employees should be
held to a particularly high standard of proof in wrongful-discharge
cases. Thus, Blades argued that employees "should be required in all
cases" to prove their claims "by affirmative and substantial evi-
dence. ' 219 Indeed, Blades went so far as to suggest that "[t]he em-
ployee might even be held to a higher burden of proof than that
normally required in civil actions. 22 ° While courts recognizing the
wrongful-discharge doctrine have been quick to cite other passages
from Blades-the balancing restraints he urged in his article have
gone unnoticed, or at least uncited-our proposal addresses all the
concerns articulated by Blades, by giving a presumption of validity
to employer-reviewed decisions and by requiring employees to rebut
that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
Any disadvantage to employees from the higher burden of proof is
offset by a statutory requirement imposed on employers of a legiti-
mate business reason for discharge. In addition, we include an attor-
ney's fees provision in our proposal to give employees and their law-
yers an incentive and the wherewithal to challenge employee
dismissals sincerely believed not to be based on legitimate reasons.
The attorney's fee provision also contemplates awards in favor of
employers as a disincentive to frivolous cases.
The final important feature in our proposal is a limitation on dam-
ages. We justify this limitation by an overriding need to bring more
certainty to the consequences of wrongful discharges, and by our be-
lief that in virtually all discharge cases, the harm for which a legal
remedy should be provided is the loss of income-not emotional dis-
tress, slander, or invasion of privacy. Moreover, the strong incentive
for formal internal review of discharges provides a vehicle for dis-
couraging the kind of employer conduct that otherwise would give
217. Blades, supra note 24, at 1428.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1429.
220. Id.
rise to these torts. Recognizing that some supervisors will engage in
abusive conduct irrespective of existing legislation, we propose that
liquidated damages be allowed if an employee shows by clear and
convincing evidence that the employer was motivated by fraud or
actual malice. The Montana Act follows this approach.
There are other potential legislative issues, but they are less cen-
tral to our proposal than those addressed above. These include the
appropriate statute of limitations. Montana chose one year. This
seems realistic. Most genuine grievances will prompt the discharged
employee to assert legitimate rights within one year. Prejudgment
interest seems warranted in order to make a discharged employee
whole.
Another issue is the degree to which interim earnings or income
that could have been earned should be an offset to any recovery.221
Our proposal provides an offset only for actual interim earnings. Lit-
igating the issue of what an employee should have earned does notjustify the time, effort and expense involved, especially if damages
are limited to four years' earnings. Our experience also strongly sug-
gests that employers who lose on the merits rarely prevail on mitiga-
tion of damages issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the judicial and legislative battles ahead, one thing seems clear:
the decisions by the California Supreme Court in Foley and New-
man and the Montana Supreme Court in Meech will have a major
influence. Because of the California court system's size and influ-
ence, the weight of those decisions extends far beyond the state's
borders.222 Foley should help shape debate in cases pending in many
other states. As one commentator noted, "'[Foley] has become sort
of mandatory law-school reading.' ",223
It remains to be seen, of course, whether courts and legislatures
across the land will take their cues from the rationales underlying
the recent decisions by the California and Montana Supreme Courts,
or whether those decisions are but temporary departures from the
historic trend toward ever-enlarged wrongful-discharge theories at
the expense of the employment-at-will doctrine.
We are persuaded that Foley, Newman, and Meech represent tem-
221. Many states, including Illinois, hold that, at common law, "the employee has
the duty to mitigate damages by seeking other employment" and that, after a reasonable
period of time, the employee "must accept suitable employment even if it pays less." M.
SHEEHAN & J. WILNER, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE UNDER ILLINOIS LAW 75-76 (The Cam-
bridge Institute 1988).
222. Schmitt, California High Court Makes Mark On Law By Limiting Damages,
Wall St. J., Jul. 11, 1989, Al, col. 1 (eastern Ed.).
223. Id. at A14, col. 2.
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porary respites in the ferment of wrongful discharge litigation. These
decisions show that strong disagreements over many issues still exist
and will likely continue to exist for the foreseeable future. Accord-
ingly, a prompt and decisive resolution is needed. Thus, we propose a
legislative solution and offer the model act described above and set
forth in the following appendix.
APPENDIX A: MODEL EMPLOYMENT DISCHARGE ACT
Section 1: Title: This Act shall be known as the "Model Employ-
ment Discharge Act".
Section 2: Policy: It is the public policy of this state to provide for
peaceful and stable labor relations; to protect employees not covered
by collective bargaining contracts against wrongful discharges; to
recognize the legitimate interest of employers in not having undue
impediments to their conduct of their businesses; to prevent the un-
certainty associated with arbitrary and unduly large damage awards;
and to provide for an expeditious and efficient method of resolving
disputes arising from the discharge of an employee. This Act shall be
construed to effectuate this policy.
Section 3: Definitions: Unless the context requires otherwise, as
used in this Act:
(a) "Person" shall mean one or more individuals, partnerships, as-
sociations, labor organizations, corporations, business trusts, attor-
neys, agents, trustees in bankruptcy or receivers, or any other
organization.
(b) "Employer" refers to any employer with fifteen or more full-
time employees and shall include any agents of the employer.
(c) "Employee" refers to any individual employed by an employer
as defined by this Act. The term "Employee" shall not include any
person whose relationship with the employer is that of an indepen-
dent contractor.
(d) "Labor Organization" shall mean any organization in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or
in part, of dealing with an employer on the matters concerning
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment, includ-
ing the settlement of grievances.
(e) "Discharge" shall mean dismissal of any employee by an em-
ployer, including any layoff or suspension for a period of time
greater than six months. The term "Discharge" shall include a con-
structive discharge. The term "Discharge" shall not include resigna-
tion, retirement, elimination of the job, layoff for lack of work, or
any other cutback in the number of employees for a legitimate busi-
ness reason.
(f) "Constructive Discharge" shall mean the termination of em-
ployment by the employee which was proximately caused by a situa-
tion, created by an act or omission of the employer, that a reasona-
ble person would find so intolerable that termination of employment
is the only reasonable alternative. A constructive discharge shall not
result solely from a failure to promote or to improve wages.
Section 4: Scope: This Act shall apply to employees covered by a
collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor
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organization, except where the collective bargaining agreement ex-
pressly provides otherwise. This Act shall not apply to any municipal
corporation, governmental agency or other governmental unit where
civil service rules or regulations govern the employee's discharge.
This Act shall also not apply to any employee who has freely entered
into a written employment contract with an employer that includes
express provisions governing termination.
Section 5: Action For Wrongful Discharge: The doctrine of em-
ployment-at-will does not apply to employees covered by this Act.
An employer may discharge an employee covered by this Act only
for a legitimate business reason. A discharge in retaliation for partic-
ipating in the exercise of any right under this Act shall be considered
a discharge for other than a legitimate business reason.
Section 6: Discharge Review Committees: (a) An employer may
establish a "Discharge Review Committee" ("DRC") to review dis-
charges of its employees. A DRC established pursuant to this Act
shall consist of at least three persons who are directors, officers or
employees of the employer. The procedures of an employer DRC
shall include, as a minimum, the procedures set forth in subsections
(b) through (g) of this Section.
(b) If an employer has established a DRC, any employee who con-
tends that the employee's discharge violated the provisions of this
Act may appeal the discharge to the DRC. Any person who had
direct supervisory authority over a discharged employee at the time
of the discharge or who was directly and materially involved in the
decision to discharge may not serve as a member of a DRC for that
employee's appeal.
(c) The employee shall commence such an appeal by providing the
employer with written notice of the employee's intention within fif-
teen days of being notified of the employer's decision to discharge.
(d) Within fifteen days after the employer receives notice from the
employee of the employee's intention to appeal the discharge, the
DRC shall review the circumstances of the discharge to determine
whether the discharge violated the provisions of this Act. The em-
ployee shall have a reasonable opportunity to present evidence to the
DRC orally or in writing or both, at the employee's option, to sup-
port the appeal.
(e) Within ten days after reviewing the circumstances of the dis-
charge, the DRC shall prepare a written statement setting forth the
DRC's conclusions concerning whether the discharge violated this
Act. The statement of the DRC shall be signed by each member of
the DRC and shall be delivered to both the employer and the em-
ployee by United States mail or personal delivery to their last known
addresses.
(f) If the DRC determines that the discharge was wrongful under
the provisions of this Act, the employee shall be reinstated in the
employee's former position, or in another comparable position if ap-
propriate. The employer shall also pay the employee any wages and
fringe benefits that the employee did not receive as a result of the
wrongful discharge. If the employer challenges the DRC's decision
in accordance with Section 7(e) of this Act, the employer may place
the employee on leave until the challenge is concluded but shall pro-
vide the compensation and benefits that the employee was receiving
at the time of the discharge.
(g) Employers that establish DRC's shall maintain written de-
scriptions of the DRC and its procedures, and shall furnish copies to
all employees.
Section 7: Judicial Proceedings: (a) An employee may apply to
any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce any of the provisions
of Section 6 of this Act.
(b) An employee may bring a private civil cause of action for
wrongful discharge for violations of Section 5 of this Act in any
court of competent jurisdiction. If the employer had established a
DRC meeting the requirements of this Act prior to the initial deci-
sion to discharge, such a cause of action may not be commenced
unless the employee has appealed to the DRC by filing the written
notice required by Section 6(c), and such cause of action may not be
commenced until the time for the issuance of the statement required
by Section 6(e) has expired.
(c) The employee shall have the burden of proving that the dis-
charge violated this Act. If the employer, at the time of the dis-
charge, had not established a DRC, the employee can prove a viola-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence. If the discharge was upheld
by a DRC in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the em-
ployer's discharge shall be given a prima facie presumption of valid-
ity, and the employee may recover for wrongful discharge only if the
employee proves by clear and convincing evidence that the discharge
violated the Act.
(d) Any action for wrongful discharge shall be commenced within
one year from the date of discharge, or within one year from the
date that the DRC issues its written statement, whichever occurs
later.
(e) An employer may apply to any court of competent jurisdiction
to set aside a DRC decision and to allow the discharge by commenc-
ing an action within one year from the date that the DRC issues its
statement as provided in Section 6(e). A DRC decision finding a
[VOL. 28: 117, 1991] Wrongful Discharge
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
discharge to be wrongful, shall be given a prima facie presumption
of validity, and may be set aside only if the employer proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the discharge was for a legitimate busi-
ness reason.
Section 8: Remedies: If a court determines that a discharge was
wrongful, it may award the following relief:
(a) The employee may be awarded actual lost earnings and fringe
benefits, together with interest thereon; provided, however, that
under no circumstances shall the period for which such earnings and
benefits are awarded exceed 4 years from the date of discharge. Ac-
tual interim earnings and fringe benefits must be deducted from the
amount awarded for lost wages.
(b) An employee may recover as liquidated damages an amount
not to exceed the amount awarded under Subsection 8(a) if it is es-
tablished by clear and convincing evidence that the employer en-
gaged in actual fraud or actual malice in the discharge of the em-
ployee in violation of Section 5 of this Act.
(c) In any action brought under the Act, the court may award the
prevailing employer or employee reasonable expenses, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees and costs.
(d) There is no right under any legal theory to damages for
wrongful discharge for pain and suffering, emotional distress, com-
pensatory damages, punitive damages, or any other form of dam-
ages, except as provided for in Subsections 8(a) - (c) of this Act.
Section 9. Preemption of Common-Law Remedies: Except as pro-
vided for by this Act, no claim of wrongful discharge may arise from
tort or express or implied contract.
Section 10: Act Not Retroactive: This Act applies only to dis-
charges subsequent to the effective date of this Act.
Section 11: Construction of Act: This Act shall be so construed as
to effectuate its general purpose. Nothing contained in this Act shall
be construed to diminish or otherwise limit the right of a labor or-
ganization or employee or group of employees to engage in any ac-
tivity protected by existing law, state or federal.

